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The Rise of China, the Rise of India, and 
the Changing Geopolitics of Asia: 
Contending Perspectives on India-China 
Relations 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
Introduction 
An important global development in the frrst decade of the 21st century 
is the rise of large developing countries. Grouped as BRICs, 1 these fast-
growing nations have catapulted over the "emerging economies" status 
and are poised to play greater roles on the world stage. Table 1 establishes 
the increasing importance ofBRICs vis-a-vis established great powers. 
It also shows long-term trends that portend the changing balance of power 
in world political and economic affairs. Of particular note is the rise of 
China and India-the two most populous nations on earth that together 
make up nearly two-fifths of humankind. The sheer magnitude of their 
ascendance caused one prominent former Singaporean ambassador to 
the United Nations to proclaim the "irresistible" shift of global power to 
Asia.2 
The rise of China and the rise oflndia are unmistakable. In 2009, 
China's and India's economies had already become the second-and 
fourth-largest, respectively. In PPP (purchasing power parity) terms, 
China's economy is already larger than Japan's and is next only to 
that of the United States; India's economy is also rapidly closing the 
gap with Japan's economy (although in official exchange rate terms 
both China and India are still relatively poor). The two Asian 
developing giants are riding on phenomenal growth rates (13.34 per 
cent per annum in 1990-2007 for China and 7.4 per cent for India) 
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and their economies performed much better than established industrial 
democracies in the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 
2008. Persistent differentiated rates of growth impact the global 
balance of power. The current financial crisis accentuates the relative 
decline of the United States (or the West in general) and the rise of 
Asia. China, and to some extent India, also become important traders, 
foreign exchange holders, military powers, and greenhouse gas 
emitters. Their stature and influence on the world stage will almost 
certainly rise. 
However, whether an ''Asian century" will finally arrive after five 
centuries of Western dominance of world affairs depends importantly 
not only on, whether India and China can continue their respective rises 
but also on how they deal with their own and the other nation's ascent. 
These two proud nations are keenly aware of the other's rise and naturally 
compare themselves with it (more on the Indian side).3 Despite their 
common aspiration to play larger global roles, th~y demonstrate sharp 
contrasts in their political systems, economic models and social structures. 
They have also maintained a very complex relationship that is weighed 
down by history but also offers promising opportunities in an era of 
globalisation (Table 1). 
While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in 
various contexts, thin scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of 
India, and how these two Asian great powers perceive the ascendancy of 
each other. · 
This paper contributes in this regard by examining the key factors 
influencing India-China relations and analysing elite perspectives in either 
nation on this relationship. It is divided into six sections. Section One 
begins with an overview of China's assessment ofits security environment 
and its evolving grand strategy. Chinese security writers have developed 
the concept of "comprehensive national power" as a convenient way to 
frame the debates on China's security assessment and external strategy. 
Section Two introduces this concept and elucidates Chinese perspectives 
on the rise of their country and potential peer competitors such as India. 
Section Three analyses the key elements that comprise the complex Indo-
Chinese relationship, including history, geography, territorial disputes, 
mutual threat perception and alignment patterns, economic partnership 
and competition; it focuses on the Indian elites' perspectives on the rise 
of China. Section Four swnmarises Chinese security analysts' perspectives 
on a rising India in the light of the changing bilateral relations. Section 
Five provides a conceptual framework by categorising Indian elites' 
perspectives on the rise of China and Indo-Chinese relations into three 
Table 1: Emerging vs. Established Great Powers: Select Indicators 
China India Brazil Russia USA 
GDP (ppp, $trillion); world rank in 2009 8.78; 3rd 3.57; 5th 2.013; 10th 2.11; 8th 14.14; 2nd 
GDP (official exchange rate $trillion) 4.909 1.236 1.574 1.255 14.26 
GDP per capita (ppp, $); world rank in 6600;128th 3100; 163rd 10, 100; 107th 15, 1 oo; 72nd 46,000; 11th 
2009 
GDP real growth rate(%); 2009 world 9.1; 4th 7.4; 10th -0.2; 114th -7.9; 206th -2.6; 157th 
rank 
GDP average annual growth rate % 13.34 7.63 6.12 4.92 5.27 
(1990-2007) 
Population (number); world rank 1.34 billion; 1.16 billion; 198.74 140.04 307.21 
1st 2nd million; 5th million; 9th million; 3rd 
Trade volume($ billion) 2158.3 432.7 280.7 495.2 2609 
Exports ($); world rank in 2009 1.204 trillion; 164.3 billion; 153 billion; 303.4 billion; 1.046 trillion; 
2nd 22nd 26th 13th 4th 
Imports ($);world rank in 2009 954.3 billion; 268.4 billion; 127.7 billion; 191.8 billion; 1.563 trillion; 
4th 14th 26th 19th 2nd 
Foreign Exchange Reserves ($ billion); 2648.3 287.74 282 476 129 
rank (Sep 2010); (Sep 2010); (Oct 2010); (Oct 2010); (Jul 2010); 
1st 6th 8th 4th 15th 
Military spending ($billion); world rank 98.8; 2nd 36.6; 10th 27.1; 12th 61.0; 5th 663; 1st 
in2008 
Defence expenditure (% GDP) 4.3 (2006) 2.5 (2006) 1.7 (2009) 3.9 (2005) 4.06(2006) 
Internet users (million); world rank in 298; 1st 81; 4th 64.948; 5th 45.25; 8th 231;2nd 
2008 
% global emission of greenhouse gases, 16.36; 1st 4.25; 7th 6.47;4th 4.58; 6th 15.74; 2nd 
2005; rank 
Sources: CIA, World Factbook. 
Japan 
4.15; 4th 
5.068 
32,700; 4oth 
-5.3; 189th 
2.21 
127.08 
million; 1oth 
1042 
542.3 billion; 
5th 
499.7 billion; 
6th 
1019 
(Jul 2009); 
2nd 
46.9; 7th 
0.8 (2006) 
90.91; 3rd 
3.17; 8th 
EU 
14.43; 1st 
16.24 
32,500; 42nd 
-4.1; 179th 
n/a 
492 million 
3642 
1.952 trillion; 
1st 
1.69 trillion; 
1st 
726 
(Eurozone, 
Aug 201 O); 3rd 
n/a 
n/a 
247 
12.08; 3rd 
;;i 
(II 
::i:, 
!:;;· 
(II 
~ g 
:::· 
~ 
s.. (II 
::i:, 
!:;;· 
(II 
~ ~ 
~ 
!=I 
00 
w 
84 Towards a New Asian Order 
paradigms: geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-civilisational. Section 
Six concludes with three possible scenarios for the future of China-India 
relations. 
China's External Strategy Since the End of the Cold War 
In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, Chinese analysts have 
been constantly assessing their country's external security environment 
and debating appropriate responses and necessary adjustments.4 Most 
analysts agree that China's security environment has markedly improved 
with the dissipation of Cold War confrontation, but some still see various 
external threats and internal challenges for China. Today's China is 
sanguine that large-scale military conflicts involving great powers are 
unlikely to occur and that China is likely to be increasingly secure from 
traditional security threats (military threats by a foreign power against 
China's territory or the physical security of China's population), but like 
other major countries, it is not immune from non-traditional security 
threats. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War 
occurred during a critical juncture of China's post-Mao development. 
Chinese leaders concluded that their country needed a peaceful 
international environment for another two decades-a period of"strategic 
importance" to concentrate on further developing its economy. Economic 
development became the overriding lynchpin to increasing China's wealth, 
power, prestige and international standing. 
For China, besides its own self-strengthening, managing relations 
with the US and navigating an international system that reflects Western 
(especially American) values and strengths would be crucial. The US, 
with its overwhelming military capabilities that could check China, but 
also the technologies and markets crucial to China's economic growth, 
could play a decisive role in China's aspirations. 
China's former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping gave guidance to 
its foreign and security policy apparatus that, collectively, has come to 
be known as the "24-character" strategy: "observe calmly; secure our 
position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; 
be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership" (lengjing 
guancha, zhanwenjiaogen, chenzhuo yingfu, taoguangyanghui, shanyu 
shouzhuo, juebu dangtou). Added later was, "make some contributions 
(you suo zuo we1)". This 24-character maxim has guided China's security 
and foreign policies since the early 1990s. The Pentagon concludes that 
taken as a whole, Deng's strategy remains instructive in that it suggests 
"both a short-term desire to downplay China's capabilities and avoid 
The Rise of China, the Rise of India ... 85 
confrontation, and a long-term strategy to build up China's power to 
maximise options forthe future."s Following Deng's fundamental strategy, 
his successors calibrated their tactics. While third-generation leaders 
(centred on Jiang Zemin) restored China to international respectability 
after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, certain actions they took also helped 
fuel the so-called "China Threat" debate.6 
China's fourth-generation leaders (centred on Hu Jintao) initially 
tried to rectify some part of the legacy of their predecessors. Domestically, 
they promoted the concept of a "harmonious society" (hexie shehul) to 
address some of the side effects ofrapid and single-minded growth, such 
as social unrest, income inequality and environmental degradation. 
Internationally, they pursued a policy of"peaceful rise" (hepingjueq1)1 
or "peaceful development" (heping fazhan) that relies on reassurance 
(good-neighbour policy) and incentives (lucrative trade or investment 
deals), by leveraging China's expanding economy. China's more polished 
foreign policy exudes confidence and poise. 8 While Western scholars have 
generally accepted that China's rise is perhaps inevitable, as ofnow there 
is no consensus on the implications of China's rise for the rest of the 
world.9 
China's "peaceful rise" policy contains several interlocking elements: 
1. It is based on an embracing of globalisation as part of the solution 
to China's growth imperatives. It relies both on China's domestic 
economy and the international marketplace to sustain and fuel 
growth. 
2. To achieve the goal of great-power status, China must secure a 
peaceful international environment, which is crucial to sustaining 
its economic development and augmenting its p~wer. Ensuring 
stability in China's periphery and avoiding a premature 
showdown with the US are thus essential.10 
3. The new diplomacy is marked by greater international 
engagement. Whereas China used to distrust "multilateralism" 
for fear that multilateral institutions could be used to constrain 
or punish it, now Chinese leaders recognise that deeply engaging 
these organisations helps promote China's trade and security 
interests and limit American power. 11 China can be pragmatic 
on contentious issues. 12 It has sought to reassure its nervous 
neighbours and has more actively engaged in regional affairs 
(e.g., hosting of the Six-Party Talks). 
4. The main instrument used for advancing China's objectives is 
its economic power-buoyed by its phenomenal· economic 
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growth, rapidly expanding domestic markets, and driven by its 
voracious appetite for raw materials needed for its economic 
development. 
To sum up, China's "peaceful rise" is a comprehensive long-term 
strategy leveraging globalisation as a catalyst to accelerate its own 
economic development and elevate its power and stature. The language 
is peace and stability; the style is constructive diplomacy; and the 
substance is economics-at least for now. 13 
Comprehensive National Power: China Tracks its Rise 
To help conceptualise the structure of the international system, track the 
major countries' changing fortunes, and evaluate the results of"peaceful 
rise", Chinese analysts have developed a "scientific" method-
Comprehensive National Power (zonghe guoli)-to predict power 
relations among the major countries. Michael Pillsbury, a noted authority 
on the Chinese military, terms the CNP as a "unique aspect of China's 
strategic assessments of the future security environment" .14 
CNP consists of tangible and intangible indicators ofnational power. 
Some writers arrive at the CNP by compiling the absolute numbers for 
each major country. Others use a relative number (e.g., a country's CNP 
as a percentage of the CNP of the United States). The goals of the different 
methods are to (1) highlight the pecking order of the major powers, and 
(2) reveal the gaps between them (most importantly, the gap between the 
US and the next few major powers that follow it). 
Chinese writers also show the evolution of CNPs over time, including 
future projections. CNP serves as a handy measure for tracking China's 
relative standing at a particular time and its rise and fall vis-a-vis other 
major countries over time. Table 2 as an example shows the relative 
importance of each component making up CNP. Table 3 compares two 
different calculations and projections of CNP scores.15 
A detailed discussion of CNP is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, for an overview of China's security assessment and external 
strategy, several findings are instructive: 
1. For the foreseeable future, the United States will remain the 
most powerful country. CNP trends confirm that the 
international structure sirice the end of the Cold War has been 
characterised by ''yi chao, duo qiang" (one superpower, many 
great powers), although the gaps between "number one" and 
"numbers two and three" have narrowed. 
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Table 2: Weighted Coefficients of Major Component Factors 
National Power Factor 
Total CNP 
Natural resources 
Economic activities capability 
Foreign economic activities capability 
Scientific and technological capability 
Social development level 
Military capability 
Government regulation and control capability 
Foreign affairs capability 
Weighted Coefficient 
1.00 
0.08 
0.28 
0.13 
0.15 
0.10 
0.10 
0.08 
0.08 
Source: Wang Songfen (ed.), Shi.fie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao.yanjiu 
[Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive National Power of the 
Worlds Major Nations](Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), p. 169. 
Table 3: CNP Scores and Ranks over Time 
(as Percentage of US CNP by Year, US= 100) (rank) 
Country 1970 1980 1989190 2000 2010 2020 
CASS CASS Huang CASS Huang CASS Huang CASS Huang CASS 
us 100 (1) 100 (1} 100 (1} 100 (1} 100 (1} 100·(1} 100 (1) 100 (1) 100 (1) 100 (2) 
China 25 (9) 33 (8) 37 (6) 34 (8) 53 (5) 42 (7) 72 (3) 52 (7) 97 (2) 61 (5) 
Germany 42 (3) 52 (3) 64 (3) 58 (3) 68 (3) 67 (3) 72 (2} 77 (3) 77 (3) 85 (3) 
Japan 34 (4) 50(4) 62(4) 58 (3) 66 (4} 76 (2) 69 (4) 97 (2) 73 (4) 119 (1) 
India 15 (10) 19 (10) 24 (9) 18 (10) 34 (8) 22 (10) 44 (6} 26 (10) 57 (5) 30 (10) 
France 33 (6} 46 (5) 47(5} 46 (5} 47 (6) 59 (4) 48 (5) 70 (4} 48 (6) 82 (4) 
Brazil -
-
26 (8) 
-
33 (9} 
-
39 (7) 
-
47 (7) 
-
England 34 (4) 42 (6) 36 (7) 42 (6) 34 (7) 48 (6) 33 (8) 54 (6) 32 (8) 60 (6) 
Canada 33 (6) 35 (7) 23 (10) 36 (7) 22 (10) 38 (8) 21 (9) 40 (8) 20 (9) 42 (8) 
Australia 26 (8) 29 (9) 19 (11} 28 (9} 18 (11} 29 (9) 17 (10) 31 (9) 17 (10) 32(9) 
USSR 64 (2) 77 (2) 65 (2) 66 (2) 79(2) 
- - - - -
Russia (50) 
-
54 (5) - 57 (5) 
-
56 (7) 
Source: The scores for 1989 and 2000 are from Huang Shuofeng, Zonghe guoli 
lun (On Comprehensive National Power) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui 
kexue chubanshe, 1992), pp. 220-1. Scores for 2010 and 2020 were 
generated by Pillsbury. Table combines Tables 9 and l 0 in Pillsbury, 
China Debates the Future Security Environment, n. 4, pp. 248-9. Huang 
=projections to'2020 of AMS {Academy of Military Science) GNP 
statistics. CASS = Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Ranks for 
the 1970 and 1980 score contain ties because Pillsbury only provided 
percentages {of US CNP) for those years; actual CNP scores were 
provided for later years. 
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2. Despite the variations in the CASS and AMS studies-the fonner 
gave Japan's economic power the kind of weight ("Japan as 
Number One") that was once common; the AMS study gave 
more credit to China's rise and better confonns to the popular 
Western image of China catching up-both studies show that 
China's CNP has improved (absolutely and relatively) from 1970 
to 2000, and is projected to improve further. By 2010, China's 
CNP will become the third-or fifth-highest, and by 2020 the 
second-or fifth-highest in the world. 
3. Until its disintegration, the Soviet Union was the second most 
powerful nation. This confirms that the international system 
during the Cold War was essentially bipolar. 
4. Germany's and Japan's CNPs were consistently around the third-
or fourth-highest. Yet as "one-dimensional powers", their limited 
military profile (as a result of their aggression and defeat during 
World War II) limited their CNP. · 
5. Over time, developing countries like China, India and Brazil 
have played increasing roles in international affairs, and their 
weights are expected to eclipse Britain, Canada and Australia. 
This adds to the "multipolarity" (duojihua) envisioned for the 
21 51 century. 
One interesting question is the geopolitical significance of the 2008 
global fmancial crisis that originated in the US. A 2009 CNP study puts the 
US and China as Number One and Two respectively. 16 The Chinese have 
begun to vigorously debate questions17 like how should China adjust its 
behaviour as its capabilities continue to grow. Should China continue to 
"hide its capacities and bide its time" (taoguang yanghui); or should it 
begin to "make contributions" (yousuo zuowel)? Should China take a more 
active approach in its external strategy? Would its interests be best served 
by focusing on playing the role of being "Number Two" (lao er)? This 
implies accepting a Western-directed world order and benefiting from it-
the "responsible stakeholder'' scenario.18 An alternative scenario is for China 
to play both hands as a stakeholder and challenger-working within the 
existing system (cooperate and soft-balance if necessary) while also 
challenging US pre-eminence.19 
This article examines one important aspect of China's security 
assessment and external strategy-Sino-Indian relations-that has not 
received as much attention of Chinese analysts as it should. 
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Indian Perspectives on Sino-Indian Relations: Key Factors 
One of the most significant developments of the 21st century is the rise 
of China and India. The economic takeoff of the world's two most 
populous nations is occurring simultaneously, portending faMeaching 
implications. As one of the growing numbers of books on this subject20 
put it, "rarely has the economic ascent of two still relatively poor nations 
been watched with such a mixture ofawe, opportunism, and trepidation."21 
While the implications of the rise of China have been debated in 
various contexts (global or systemic, regional, bilateral), little scholarly 
discussion has been devoted to either the rise of lndia22 or how they 
perceive the ascendancy of the other. Yet as constructivists23 would argue, 
how these two very different Asian giants perceive and deal with each 
other will be important for scholarly interest and policymaking. This 
section analyses this complex relationship and examines how Indian 
elites-in political, security, and economic arenas-perceive the rise of 
China. 
History 
Although China and India were two adjoining civilisations, there was 
remarkably little historical evidence of direct political interaction between 
them. 24 However, there was mutual intellectual fascination. Many Chinese 
scholars visited India in the first millennium to study Buddhism and other 
subjects, and spent a decade or more in India. Chinese monks such as 
Faxian in the fifth century and Xuanzang in the seventh played important 
roles in introducing Buddhism to China and bridging the two cultures. 
Many Indian scholars also went to China and worked there between the 
first century and the eleventh.25 
Religion was not the only relationship between the two. Trade was 
also important. Indian intermediaries facilitated trade between China and 
Western Asia for centuries.26 A branch of the famous Silk Road extended 
into the plains of northern India. Yet for the most part there was little 
interaction-mostly indirect-between China and India before the arrival 
of Western imperial powers. 
Colonialism affiicted both India and China and pitted the two 
civilisations against each other. During the Opium Wars (1839-1842), 
Britain tried to forcibly sell the opium from its East India Company in 
China. The two nations' shared colonial experience made for empathy-
an Asian anti-colonial pride-between them. Nehru and Gandhi were 
friendly with the Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. India gained 
independence from Britain in 1947. When Mao Zedong established the 
90 Towards a New Asian Order 
communist regime in China in 1949, India was among the first to recognise 
the People's Republic of China on April I, 1950. Nehru, typical oflndian 
leaders, personally invested in maintaining friendly ties with China and 
cultivated personal relationships with Chinese leaders, especially Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai. Nehru, who promoted the slogan "Hindi-Chini bhai-
bhat' (India and China are brothers), reportedly said, "China was my 
most admired nation."27 An Indian security analyst said, "From the 1950s 
on, we have looked at China from an Asian solidarity standpoint-whether 
it was nuclear weapons (China's 1964 explosion) or the United Nations 
(PRC's entry in 1971)."28 
However, the goodwill was short-lived. The colonial legacy also 
sowed the seeds of discord. The McMahon Line-a demarcation line 
drawn on the map referred to in the 1914 Shimla Accord, signed between 
Britain and Tibet-was to form the boundary between British India and 
Tibet, over which China claimed suzerainty. While Britain and Tibet 
considered the agreement binding, China disputed the McMahon Line. 
India considered the line an international boundary. It was the root of the 
thorny and persistent border dispute between India and China (to be 
discussed later). Figures 1 and 2 show the disputed borders on the eastern 
sector (today's Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, formerly North East 
Frontier Agency) and on the western sector (today's Chinese region of 
Aksai Chin). 
In 1950 China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Tibet and 
took control of the vast region that had historically served as a buffer (in 
strategic and cultural terms) between India and China. As former Indian 
army chief of staff General Ved P. Malik put it, "The first time we (Indians) 
came into direct contact with the Han Chinese was after 1950, when the 
PRC occupied Tibet. We suddenly became neighbours."29 In 1959, after 
the failed uprising against the PRC, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tibet's 
highest religious and political leader, fled to India. Nehru in 1960 offered 
Dharamshala as a location for the government of Tibet in exile. The 
Tibetan refuge in India became another irritant in the bilateral relationship. 
In 1962 the small skirmishes not uncommon along the disputed border 
escalated into open military confrontation. War erupted on October 20, 
1962 when Chinese troops forcibly evicted Indian troops from the Dhola 
post in the eastern sector. Over the next month the Chinese troops easily 
overwhelmed ill-prepared Indian troops in all sectors along the McMahon 
Line. Then on November 21, the Chinese government announced a 
unilateral withdrawal to points where it considered the territorial 
boundaries to be. Although the war did not change the status quo of the 
border, India essentially had lost the war, suffering territorial loss and 
national humiliation. Ever since then, the 1962 war has cast a long shadow 
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over the Indo-Chinese relationship, and India's defeat has coloured the 
Indians' perceptions of China. 
The worsening Indo-Chinese relations became entangled in the 
regional alignment during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union and India 
on one side and China and Pakistan (and later the US) on the other. China's 
successful nuclear test in 1964 deepened Indian apprehensions. If the 
1962 war taught India the importance of indigenous conventional 
deterrence, India's nuclear test in 1974 sought to respond to China's 
nuclear capabilities. From 1962 to 1976 China and India were mired in a 
tense cold war. It was not until 1976 that the two countries again exchanged 
ambassadors. History clearly casts a long shadow on Indo-Chinese 
relations (Fig. l, 2 and 3). 
Geography 
Historically, China and India each had their own geographic orientation: 
China toward East Asia and India toward South Asia. But modem Tibet 
after China's entry in 1950 connected these two spheres. The development 
of missile technologies, made possible by the two countries' economic 
growth, had the effect of"shrinking the strategic chessboard".30 
In recent years, China has expanded its influence in the Central and 
South West Asian areas by organising and promoting the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SC0);31 India has pursued a Look East policy 
of strengthening its relationships with countries in East and South East 
Asia. Both countries seek to play a greater role in areas adjacent to their 
own, and even farther. China and India thus manoeuvre on overlapping 
"strategic spaces". 
Ranjit Gupta, a former Indian ambassador to five countries, thinks 
that China has always treated India with hostility, adopting a "systematic 
plan" to hem in India with the support of Pakistan, and its influence in 
Myanmar, Nepal and Bangladesh, and military activities in Tibet. He 
argues that historically China has behaved like an imperial power, 
expanding when the empire was strong. 32 
In the past decade, to ensure its energy security and shore up its oil 
supply route, 33 China has constructed facilities and secured access to ports 
around India (e.g., Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, 
Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar), prompting some 
foreign analysts to label this a "String of Pearls" strategy (see Figure 3). 
Some sensitive Indians warn that China is turning the Indian Ocean into 
a "Chinese Lake".34 In 2009 China dispatched destroyers to the Gulf of 
Aden to protect Chinese merchant ships from Somali pirates operating in 
that area. The flotilla's passage through the Indian Ocean caused some 
concern in India. 
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Figure 1: China-India Border: Eastern Sector 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg 
Territorial Disputes 
Among all the issues separating China and India, the territorial disputes 
arising from the undemarcated border significantly inform the Indian 
perspectives of China. Almost every Indian informant during my field 
research in 2008 raised the border issue as a major obstacle to better 
Indo-Chinese relationship. They feared that the potential of a flare-up 
still exists. 35 
The Rise of China, the Rise of India ... 
C"hln•· ladla Bonltr: Wttlttn S«tor 
) 
( 
..-"""" ...... ,..,, C~i>:> • ..-t.,,..,~"~~~~~ 
Q b>.,~ .... 
--~~~~~ 
_,_ -~...,-~,~~-w!'<!h:,.., 
~-~ .... , .. ~ 
Figure 2: China-India Border: Western Sector 
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Source: http:! /en. wikipedia.org/wiki/File:China _India_ westem _border_ 88.jpg 
As mentioned earlier, the border disputes can be traced back to the 
McMahon Line. After the 1962 war, the two sides largely observed the 
Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the eastern sector and the Line of Control 
(LOC) in the western sector. The results are that China claims the Indian-
controlled Arunachal Pradesh and India claims the Chinese-controlled 
Aksai Chin. The Chinese claim is partially based on Tawan(, the 
birthplaceof the sixth Dalai Lama. The Chinese argue that Tawang is 
Source: http://www.marinebuzz.com/2008/01/23/china-garlands-india-with-string-of-pearls/ 
Figure 3: "String of Pearls" 
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Tibetan territory and Tibet is part of China; therefore, the entire Arunachal 
Pradesh is Chinese territory. India claims Aksai Chin, which connects 
Tibet and China's north-western province Xinjiang, as the eastern-most 
part of its Jammu and Kashmir state.36 Kashmir itself was partitioned 
three-way by India, Pakistan and China. 
Occasionally the Chinese emphasis on their legal titles provokes the 
Indians. Just days before President Hu Jintao's state visit to India in 
November 2006, the Chinese ambassador to India Sun Yuxi declared, 
"In our position the whole of what you call the state ofArunachal Pradesh 
is Chinese territory and Tawang is only one place in it and we are claiming 
all of that. That's our position."37 In 2007 the Chinese Embassy in Delhi 
decided to strengthen its position by declining a visa to an Indian official 
from Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that he did not need one as he 
was a "Chinese citizen".38 The respective statuses of Tibet and Sikkim, 
the latter of which India incorporated in 197 5 as its twenty-second state, 
also add to the complexity.39 
In reality, this issue is mainly a placeholder and its impact will be 
"bounded". In recent years, the two sides have set up working groups 
to deal with the issue and try to resolve it peacefully, but have little to 
show for it. They have also sought to "compartmentalise" this issue 
from the overall improvement of the bilateral relationship.40 As an 
American diplomat aptly put it, "The border issue is unlikely to be a 
serious problem in the relationship, because both sides benefit from 
this 'festering' that allows them to justify more military spending and 
certain postures."41 
Mutual Threat Perception and Triangular Strategic Relations/zips 
As Table 4 shows, both countries have substantial military capabilities. 
Over time, each has deployed certain weapons against the other. As 
mentioned before, India's 1974 nuclear test was spurred by China's 
successful test in 1964. India, under a government led by the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP), in 1998 again conducted nuclear tests. India's minister 
for defence, George Fernandes, specifically rationalised this action as a 
counter to the threat India perceived from a rising China and closer Sino-
Pakistani alliance.42 
China has always loomed large in India's defence and foreign policies. 
The 1962 war, the border dispute, the complex menages a trois (China-
India-US and China-India-Pakistan) and each nation's ambitions all play 
a role, causing each to suspect the true intentions of the other. Some 
Indians viewed the SCO and the String of Pearls with concern. China's 
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military assistance to Pakistan allows the latter to act as a proxy to "weigh 
down" India. 
A hardnosed Indian analyst asserts, "China and India are natural rivals 
in Asia for geo-strategic, economic, and ideological (democracy vs. 
autocracy) reasons. In every aspect, we are contrasts. Our interests clash. 
We also compete for the same resources in Africa. Such rivalry is not 
easily reconcilable."43 Many Indians feel that a rising China may make it 
harder for India to ascend.44 
Economic Partners/tip and Rivalry 
In many aspects, China's economic data is more impressive than India's 
(see Table 4): China has achieved higher growth rates, higher income 
levels, larger economy, greater trade volumes, and has attracted more 
foreign investment. But their economies are also complementary. China's 
success stems from being the manufacturing base of foreign multinationals 
with global sales networks; India's is domestically oriented, focusing on 
engineering and service.45 China's hardware proficiency can complement 
India's software prowess. Some Indians and (fewer) Chinese envision 
the two nations merging into a giant "Chindia"-a formidable economic 
partnership with the world's largest populations and complementary 
economic strengths.46 
Yet their two economies also compete, especially over the energy 
resources each needs for economic development. WhHe many in the Indian 
business community see an economically rising China as an opportunity 
(for Indian products or services, for business alliance possibilities), more 
see it as a threat. 
During my field trip to Mumbai and Delhi in May-June 2008, I sought 
to study the impact of Chinese products on Indian companies and 
consumers by direct observation and elite interviews. Indian companies 
that exclusively serviced the domestic market often complained about 
the inexpensive Chinese goods flooding the Indian market. Consumers 
were more ambivalent: While they generally liked the low-cost Chinese 
goods, they were also concerned about food and product safety as well 
as the quality of the goods. Indian companies that sell to international 
markets invariably faced strong competition from their Chinese 
counterparts. Some executives wondered that the incredibly low prices 
of the Chinese products, which undermined the Indian companies, were 
because of the Chinese government's help.47 In this regard, India's 
experience is not too different from that of other countries with a backlash 
against cheap and unsafe Chinese products. 
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Table 4: China vs. India: Rise of Two Asian Giants 
..--
Indicator (Unit), information as of 2010 China India 
GDP (with PPP) ($ bn) 9872 4046 
World Rank 2 4 
GDP Real Growth Rate(%) 10.3 8.3 
GDP (official exchange rate)($ bn) 5745 1430 
GDP Per Capita (with PPP) ($) 7400 3400 
Exports ($ bn) 1506 201 
Imports ($ bn) 1307 327 
Main export partners (%) us (20.0), UAE (12.9), 
Hong Kong us (12.6), 
(12.0), Japan China (5.6) 
(8.3), S Korea 
(4.6) 
Main import partners (%) Japan (12.3), China 
Hong Kong (10.9), us 
(10.1 ), S Korea (7.2), Saudi 
(9.0), U.S. Arabia (5.4), 
(7.9) UAE (5.2) 
Stock of foreign direct investment at home ($ tin) 574.3 191.1 
Foreign exchange reserves ($ bn) 2622 284.1 
Population (mn) 1321.9 1129.9 
Armed Forces (number) 2,105,000 1,288,000 
Main Battle Tanks (number) 7660 4059 
Artillery (number) 17,600d 5680 
Surface Combatant Vessels (number) 75 48 
Submarines (number) 62 16 
Aircraft Carriers (number) 0 1d 
Combat Aircraft (number) 2554 599 
Attack Helicopters (number) 39 20 
Nuclear weapon status Confirmed Confirmed 
Chemical weapon status Probable Confirmed 
Biological weapon status Suspected Unknown 
Short-range ballistic missile status Confirmed Confirmed 
Medium-range ballistic missile status Confirmed Confirmed 
Intermediate-range ballistic missile status None Confirmed 
Submarine-launched ballistic missile status Confirmed Probable 
Intercontinental ballistic missile status Confirmed None 
Strategic bomber status (text) None None 
(Contd.) 
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Indicator (Unit), information as of 2010 China India 
Strategic submarine status (text) Confirmed None 
WMD Commitments (text) BlWC, ewe, NPr'* BlWC,CWC 
Notes: All economic data are as of end of2010 and all military data are as of 
2007. 
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/ and National Bureau of Asian 
Research Strategic Asia Database Query, http://strategicasia.nbr.org/ 
data/DataSheet/Criteria.aspx; accessed 20 April 2011. 
Cooperation and Competition in Global Governance 
The two aspiring great powers maintain an extremely complex relationship 
regarding global governance (the respective role of each country and the 
role of the Global South in general). On several global economic issues 
they cooperate. The two led the "uprising" of the Global South at the 
2003 Cancun meeting which led to the halting of the Doha Round of the 
World Trade Organisa!ion (WTO). They often criticise the "democratic 
deficit" of Bretton Woods institutions, such as the WTO, International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and advocate expanded roles and 
higher profiles of the Global South (especially, large emerging countries 
such as China and India). They also accuse the Global North of being 
hypocritical and self-serving for wanting to pry open the service, 
investment and IT sectors of the Global South while protecting the 
politically influential agricultural sectors at home. 
In the December 2009 at the Copenhagen conference on global 
climate change China and India also adopted similar positions, including 
insisting on the developing countries' right to economic development, 
declining to accept mandatory cuts in pollution levels, and instead 
proposing to decrease the energy intensity of industries. These positions 
belie the fact that China and India are now the world's largest and third-
Jargest emitters of carbon dioxide respectively. 48 Both members of the 
so-called BRICS, China and India, have tried to coordinate their policies 
on severa issues related to global governance. 
However, the two also clash on other key issues. China is a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council. India lobbies for "UN 
reform" including expansion of the Security Council in the name of greater 
democracy and fairer representation. India has argued that it deserves a 
permanent seat because it has the world's second-largest population (which 
will become the largest in a few decades) and nuclear weapons, and there 
is only one Asian country and one developing country on the SC. China 
has been decisively cold to the idea of UNSC expansion. It jealously 
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guards its own seat. It also rebuffs several other developing-country 
potentials, such as India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, because 
admitting any of them would also lead to the admission of Japan and 
Germany, which provide important financial support to the UN. China is 
most opposed to Japan's seat. Consequently, it must also reject India's 
bid. China can thus ensure it will have more global influence than India. 
Being among the world's fastest growing economies, China and India 
both have huge energy needs and have elevated the importance of"energy 
security" in their external strategies, including global sourcing and 
transport of oil. While China is more aggressive in this regard, the two 
share many similarities in their attempt to achieve energy security. This 
could be another area of potential conflict. 
Chinese Perspectives on a Rising India 
Until now Chinese elite discourse on India has been predominantly 
informed by realism. This observation based on my field research consists 
of several aspects: (I) war and territorial disputes, (2) spheres of influence, 
(3) alignment, (4) power considerations,49 and (5) mistrust. 
The 1998 Indian nuclear tests ironically became a turning point in 
Chinese perspectives about, and policies toward, India. As the CNP 
comparisons in Table 3 show, throughout the Cold War and until the late 
1990s, China was, as Avery Goldstein pointed out, not convinced that 
relations with India would be as strategically significant for it as the 
relations it was cultivating with other major powers.50 The generally 
sceptical or dismissive view of India held by Chinese elites stemmed 
resulted from several reasons: (1) China's confidence stemming from its 
military victory over India in 1962, (2) China's more impressive economic 
performance compared to India's, (3) India's ethnic, religious and 
linguistic diversity (or cleavage), which Chinese analysts generally view 
as a handicap, and (4) India's domestic politics (federal system, extremely 
fragmented party politics, a chaotic democracy lacking efficiency), which 
they also generally view as a serious impediment to India's future 
prospects-the Indian form of democracy is anathema to China. 
After India's 1998 nuclear tests, however, official relations have 
warmed. In June 2003 Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a historic 
visit to China, the first in over a decade. The two countries have elevated 
their relationship to one of "strategic and cooperative partnership" for 
peace and stability. During President Hu Jintao's visit to India in 
November 2006, the two sides adopted a ten-point strategy to further 
strengthen the bilateral relationship. Jingdong Yuan, a China expert, 
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quoted a Chinese diplomat: "Beijing now views its relationship with India 
as one of global and strategic importance that is long-term, all around, 
and stable."51 
Diplomatic pleasantries notwithstanding, Chinese perspectives on 
India in the early decade of the twenty-first century embody the following 
elements: 
• While China must accomplish its goal of"peaceful rise", it must 
also realise that India is also rising and has ambitions to play a 
greater role in regional and global politics and economics. 
• China must "manage" India's rise by reducing the threats it will 
pose to China and by selectively cooperating on issues of mutual 
interest. 
• China should reduce or eliminate the chance that India may harm 
China's interests by compartmentalising the border disputes, 
containing the Tibet issue, and keeping alive the "Pakistan card". 
• China must carefully monitor the implications oflndia's military 
modernisation and India's growing security and overall relations 
with the US lest they harm China's interests or aspirations. 
• To enhance cooperation, China should increase trade with India. 
It should also attempt to cajole India into taking its same side 
on various international issues. 
While Indian-Chinese relations have changed-for the better in many 
respects-the above complex motivations and calculations show that 
bilateral relations will remain mainly instrumental and pragmatic, rather 
than effective, and there remain limits to cooperation and potential for 
conflicts. To sort out the alternative scenarios, we need to not only inquire 
into the distribution of the various types of elites (realists, liberals, 
constructivists; so far the realists dominate both sides), b11t also can benefit 
from three contrasting paradigms.52 
Contending Paradigms 
Geopolitics 
As soon as India and China came into direct contact through the Tibet 
nexus, geography has conditioned their relations. China and India are 
neighbours. The Chinese have a saying, "A distant relative is less useful 
than a proximate neighbour." Friends can change, neighbours cannot. 
"You can't change geography", says an Indian think-tank analyst.53 So 
the logic goes, India must get along with China. Indeed, various Indian 
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leaders have made this a priority, although many Indians feel that India's 
goodwill is not reciprocated. A third neighbour-Pakistan-further 
complicates this relationship. 
The strategic spaces of these two Asian giants overlap and they both 
have ambitions to become major regional, if not world, powers. The 
Chinese have a saying, "The same mountain cannot accommodate two 
tigers." From the Indian perspectives, India cannot accept Chinese 
hegemony. A rising China makes India's ascent more difficult, if not 
impossible. This can also partly explain why the Indians felt compelled 
to sign a landmark nuclear agreement with the US. 
In the geopolitical paradigm, the logic of balance of power prevails. 
Competition, mutual suspicion, alliance and military build-up-standard 
tenets of realism-have heavily conditioned Indo-Chinese relations. 
Power is important in this paradigm. Tan Chung depicts power politics 
as horizontal expansion, which leads to border disputes. As stated, 
historically China and India did not have border disputes. China did not 
occupy Tibet until 1950. Modem concepts of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity have ensnarled both China and India. Many of my informants 
seemed to accept certain basic realist premises and their arguments 
confirmed the geopolitics paradigm. Viewing Indo-Chinese relations 
through the geopolitics paradigm will, however, have r. negative impact 
on the relationship. 
Geo-economics 
Yet at the same time, China and llldia are both rising economically. And 
there exists a complementarity between their economies. In the geo-
economics paradigm, the logic is interconnectivity and mutual 
dependence. This creates space (complementarity) and turns the zero-
sum competition in the first paradigm into a win-w1n situation. An 
increasing number of books champion this prospect:54 China's hardware 
combining with India's software; China's yang blending with India's yin. 
Judging from the relatively still moderate trade between the two55 and the 
fact that neither is a key trading partner of the other, there exists immense 
potential for a closer economic partnership to gradually emerge, which 
would help ameliorate the overall bilateral relationship. However, the 
emergence ofa "Chindia" requires a leap of faith that is not supported by 
evidence.56 While several of my informants thought Chindia was a good 
idea, almost nobody predicted it would happen. 
Geo-civilizations 
The third paradigm is not the mainstay of Western international relations 
102 Towards a New Asian Order 
theories. It is reflectivist rather than rationalist. Its logic is affinity rather 
than material interests. 
Economic historian Angus Maddison opined that in the past one 
thousand years China's population had constituted one-third to one-sixth 
of the world's population and India's population had sometimes been 
larger than China's. Tan Chung opined that this meant that these two 
countries were most hospitable. He described the relationship between 
the two as "made in heaven". With population congregating, wealth was 
created. With their shared origins in the Himalayas, the Ganges and the 
Indus gave rise to the Indian civilisation and the Yellow and the Yangtze 
to the Chinese civilisation. As Sen pointed out, before the modem era 
there was a lot of mutual admiration between China and India. In the 
twentieth century the two also shared Asian pride and anti-colonial 
solidarity. Their mutual suspicion and antipathy is a more recent 
phenomenon. 
Mao Zedong in his lifetime only visited two "countries": the Soviet 
Union and the Indian embassy. Nehru, whose affection for China was 
legendary, was welcomed by 500,000 people when he visited China. Every 
Chinese believes that when they die, they "return to the west" (India). 
Buddhism originated in India but flourished in China. One Indian scholar 
hailing from Ladakh summarised his visits to China this way, "People 
conjure up India as 'the land of the Buddha' or land of poverty."57 Although 
some Indians rightly feel that the Chinese may ha~e behaved in a 
condescending or overbearing way toward the Indians, China's current 
advantage is not preordained nor can it be expected to last forever. 
This paradigm will call for a total re-conceptualisation of the Indo-
Chinese relationship. It may be far-fetched to think of an Indo-Chinese 
partnership that is as cordial or close as the US-UK bond. But appreciating 
each other's civilisational attractiveness can create a deeper and more 
enduring bond that is currently missing in the Indo-Chinese relationship. 
Based on my fieldwork in 2006 and 2008, an overwhelming majority 
of Chinese informants (85 per cent) adopt the geopolitical paradigm, a 
minority geo-economic, and virtually nobody geo-civilisational. In India, 
roughly 60 per cent of informants adhere to the geopolitical paradigm, 
30 per cent geo-economic, and I 0 per cent geo-civilisational. This rough 
estimate of the distribution of elite beliefs helps inform the future oflndo-
Chinese relations. 
Prospects: Whither? 
What would the future hold for Indo-Chinese relations? Three scenarios 
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emerge. The first is continued, even heightened, rivalry-guided by the 
logic of the geopolitics paradigm. Indications of this are not difficult to 
find. China figures prominently in Indian defence planning. China's 
growing military and economic power may deeply unsettle India. With 
newly accumulated wealth from almost two decades of fast growth, India 
may devote greater resources to the military. It will become more aligned 
with the US-in a reversal of its stance during the Cold War. The US-
Indian nuclear agreement epitomised this trend. China may enhance its 
support of Pakistan and increase its influence in the South Asian continent, 
the Indian Ocean and South West Asia. 
The second possibility is "Chindia"--driven by the logic of the geo-
economics and geo-civilisations paradigms-to jointly promote a 
multipolar world and a more equitable global order (e.g., reforming the 
United Nations). However, an Indo-Chinese entente aimed at the US is 
unlikely, as each derives many benefits by maintaining a good relationship 
with the US. 
The third possibility is a pragmatic management of their relationship, 
seeking solutions to their unresolved disputes while exploring areas of 
cooperation. Compared to the hot war of 1962 and the cold war that 
ensued, ludo-Chinese relationship has shown promise ofnormalisation. 
However, irritants still exist. The two sides should not be satisfied with 
prolonged but indecisive talks on settling the border issue. The Chinese 
had border disputes with just about every one of their land neighbours. 
For long periods of time, China typically remained stuck in principled 
positions without any real progress, but it has shown in a number of cases 
that it can make concessions and conclude an agreement.58 Both China 
and India need to show greater political will for settling the border dispute 
(beginning with mutual recognition of each other's actual control). Other 
confidence-building measures, such as greater Chinese sensitivity to Indian 
concerns about China's support to Pakistan and more transparency and 
better communication to prevent accidents or misperceptions, would help. 
For a truly solid relationship, the two can benefit from the insights of the 
geo-civilisation paradigm. 
China and India are two great nations, both making remarkable a 
transformation. Their choices, including the interpreting the other's 
intentions, will importantly shape our future world. Like Alexander Wendt 
cogently said, "Anarchy is what states make ofit."59 The future oflndo-
Chinese relationship is not condemned to rivalry and hostility; nor will a 
Chindia naturally result just because it "makes sense". To return to the 
constructivist's axiom, it depends on the evolving structure of elite 
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identities and preferences, infonned by the three paradigms and socialised 
through interactions. 
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